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Exploring Minds:
Modes of Modelling and Simulation in
Artificial Intelligence
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to grasp the relevant distinctions
between various ways in which models and simulations in Articial Intel-
ligence (AI) relate to cognitive phenomena. In order to get a systematic
picture, a taxonomy is developed that is based on the coordinates of formal
versus material analogies and theory-guided versus pre-theoretic models
in science. These distinctions have parallels in the computational versus
mimetic aspects and in analytic versus exploratory types of computer sim-
ulation. This taxonomy cuts across the traditional dichotomies between
symbolic / embodied AI, general intelligence / cognitive simulation and
human / non-human-like AI.
According to the taxonomy proposed here, one can distinguish between
four distinct general approaches that gured prominently in early and
classical AI, and that have partly developed into distinct research pro-
grammes: rst, phenomenal simulations (e.g., Turing’s “imitation game”);
second, simulations that explore general-level formal isomorphisms in
pursuit of a general theory of intelligence (e.g., logic-based AI); third, sim-
ulations as exploratory material models that serve to develop theoretical
accounts of cognitive processes (e.g., Marr’s stages of visual processing
and classical connectionism); and fourth, simulations as strictly formal
models of a theory of computation that postulates cognitive processes to
be isomorphic with computational processes (strong symbolic AI).
In continuation of pragmaticist views of the modes of modelling and
simulating world aairs (Humphreys, Winsberg), this taxonomy of ap-
proaches to modelling in AI helps to elucidate how available computa-
tional concepts and simulational resources contribute to the modes of
representation and theory development in AI research – and what made
that research programme uniquely dependent on them.
2
1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Articial Intelligence (AI) is a diverse research programme that includes many, partly
competing, approaches and that comes with many, often diverging, aspirations. De-
spite its disunity and its perpetually pre-paradigmatic status in Kuhnian terms, AI
is currently experiencing a renaissance. In doing so, it also undergoes numerous
transformations that make it ever more dicult to determine its purpose and content.
This paper seeks to systematically account for the diversity of AI and to identify its
common themes on the grounds of a critical reconstruction of the various modes of
modelling and simulation that are used in the eld. These distinctions are instructive
for the modelling and simulation debates in the philosophy of science, but also for the
philosophy and theory of AI: how do models and simulations relate to world aairs?
How and to what purpose are they made to do so? What bearing do answers to these
questions have on various approaches to AI?
In order to at least begin to answer these questions, a taxonomy is developed that
builds, rst, on the distinctions between formal and material analogies in scientic
modelling, and between theory-guided and pre-theoretic models (Section 2). These
two aspects of models in science have relevant analogies in the realm of computer
simulations: on the one hand, simulations comprise computational and phenomenal
elements, typically but not necessarily in conjunction. On the other hand, one can
distinguish between analytic, mathematical and synthetic, exploratory types of com-
puter simulations (Section 3). Using these conceptual distinctions as co-ordinates,
four approaches to modelling and simulation in AI will be outlined (Section 4). These
distinctions cut across a variety of well-established dichotomies that have been used
to conceptually sort the eld of AI. This taxonomy will help to elucidate how avail-
able computational concepts and simulational resources contribute to the modes of
representation and theory development in AI research – and what made that research
programme uniquely dependent on them (Section 5).
2 A Variety of Models
In the various analyses of the role of models in science that emerged towards the end
of the 19th century, there are two recurring questions: rst, how do models represent
an object or “target system”? The two basic types of representation are formal and
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material, but they occur in various forms and arrangements. Second, what is the
relationship between models and theories? Models can either be derived from an
existing theory, or they can enable the development of a theory. In principle, however,
they can also be completely independent of any theory.
The authors who rst introduced the concept of models into philosophical reections
about science were quite inclusive, if not vague, in their accounts of what models
are and how they represent. Ludwig Boltzmann (1902) refers to models as “tangible
representations” in the rst sentence of his “Model” Encyclopaedia Britannica entry,
but then allows models to be “constructed [. . . ] in thought” and “mentally conceived”
at the end of the very same sentence (1902, 788).
Heinrich Hertz (1899, 1-2) commences his inquiry into models from a notion of “our
conceptions of things” as mental images and develops a picture-theoretic account of
models that denes them mathematically as point-to-point mappings between states
and transformations in image and original while taking them to directly concern
perceptual experience and experimental measurements (Hertz 1899, 30). He maintains
that modelling relations are identical to the relations between mental images and the
“things themselves” in general (Hertz 1899, 177). All science, then, is model-based, and
the models it employs involve both mathematical mapping, which may or may not
happen ‘in the head’, and more material, observation-based relations.
Hertz’ and Boltzmann’s broad and inclusive views of models have given way to
more dierentiated accounts of how models relate to world aairs in classical mid-20th
century philosophy of science: Max Black (1962, Ch. XIII) distinguishes between
analogue models, theoretical models and “archetypes” (plus physical scale models and
mathematical models, which are deemed less pertinent to scientic inquiry).
The purpose of analogue models is to “reproduce as faithfully as possible in some
new medium the structure or web of relationships in the original”, where that repro-
duction establishes relations of isomorphism, formally dened in similar fashion to
Hertz’ view as “point-to-point correspondence” between relations in the model and
relations in the original, which may but need not depend on a pre-existing theory
of the target domain (Black 1962, 222, emphasis in original). In the mathematical
parlance introduced by Black, isomorphism is an identity relation between structures
in terms of a bijective function that individually pairs every element in one structure
with exactly one element in the other. As examples of changes of medium, Black cites
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“hydraulic models of economic systems, or the use of electrical circuits in computers”
(1962, 222), under the premise that the formally expressed isomorphism relations hold
independent of the choice of medium.
Black’s theoretical models are more conceptual and pragmatic and less formal in
nature, involving the transfer of theoretical concepts from a well-explored domain
of science to a less explored one, in order to facilitate the building and testing of
hypotheses in the latter. They do not presuppose a theory of the target domain but
are employed to develop it in the rst place. Unlike analogue models though, the
performance of their epistemic tasks depends on the choice of medium. Given that,
according to Black’s example example, Clerk Maxwell modelled the electrical eld
“in terms of the properties of an imaginary incompressible uid” (Black 1962, 226),
the properties of that incompressible uid will have a direct bearing on the set of
hypotheses concerning the electrical eld that are derived from the model.
Lastly, Black’s archetypes are, often implicit and always informal, guiding metaphors
that organise an entire eld of inquiry, and as such bear some resemblance to Kuh-
nian paradigms. On Black’s view, these three types of models stand in a relation of
decreasing formality and strictness and increasing generality and epistemic import.
A rst attempt at distinguishing models along the kinds of likeness between model
and target system on the one hand and between its kinds of relationship to theories on
the other was introduced by Ernest Nagel (1961, Ch. 6). Both “formal” and “substantial”
analogies, he suggests, can be used to construct a theory or to extend its range of
application, or to apply a pre-existing theory. Consequently, two types of analogy are
co-ordinated with two types of uses, where these two axes are considered independent.
In her classic account of models and analogies, Mary Hesse (1966) chooses not to
detach these two aspects. Instead, she relies on a binary distinction between material,
pre-theoretic and formal, theory-guided analogies, which she characterises as follows:
there is one-to-one correspondence between dierent interpretations of
the same formal theory, which we may call formal analogy, and there are
pretheoretic analogies between observables [. . . ] which enable predictions
to be made from a model. Let us call this second sense material analogy.
[. . . ] It should be noticed that if material analogies between models and
explicanda are to do the predictive job required of them, they must be
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observable similarities between corresponding terms and must not depend
on a theory of the explicandum. (Hesse 1966, 68, 69, emphasis in original)
Denitionally, Hesse’s requirements for models can be pinned down as follows:
M-1 material models are structures that bear observable and pre-theoretic similarities
to, and thereby enable predictions of, their target systems.
M-2 formal models are structures that express interpretations of a formal theory,
without observable similarities being required.
Denition M-2 echoes the “syntactic” view of theories, under which models are for-
mally described structures of which all axioms of a theory are true, and which provide
concrete values to its variables (for a paradigmatic formulation of this view, see Tarski
1953 and its critical discussion in Suppes 1960). Under the syntactic view, models may
remain independent of any observable phenomena and their explanation, although in
practice they typically serve the mapping of a theory onto a given set of phenomena.
The formal analogies involved are ‘vertically’ determined by the theory, in that the
same equations are used in otherwise disjunct domains of phenomena that do not
display similarities in observables between them from which predictions could be
generated. Hesse cites the Mathieu’s equation as an example, as it equally applies
to the behaviour of elliptic membranes and to the movements of a balancing artist
among other things. Despite being described by the same set of theoretical axioms,
these phenomena do not display observable analogies that otherwise might allow for
prediction or explanation of one domain in light of the properties of the other.
Hence, the primary mark of distinction between material and formal models is not
the way in which they are expressed but, rst, their mode of reference to observables.
Second, they are distinguished by being determinants of theory or determined by
theory respectively.
With respect to the role of material models in theory-building, a key role accrues
to, in Hesse’s words, “neutral analogies”. They are relations assumed to hold between
model and target system that, at the time of the model’s introduction, cannot be
proven to hold or not to hold. Their specic value lies in their capacity to explore the
properties of the target system by generating predictions of its behaviour in light of
that analogy, which are to be conrmed or disconrmed at a later stage of inquiry.
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Neutral analogies are thus identied as the “growing points” of a theory (Hesse 1966,
8-10). In this specic and important sense, the function of models is exploratory, as
guides for theory construction that are neither dened nor constrained by pre-existing
theory. In order to elucidate the exploratory role of models, Hesse chooses the example
of the “ether” in the development of the wave theory of light. When the wave theory
of sound was transferred to explanations of the behaviour of light, ether was chosen
as the neutral analogue of “air”, besides a number of established positive and negative
analogies between sound and light. There was well-founded knowledge concerning
the behaviour of air as a medium for the transmission of sound waves, from which
predictions were derived concerning the behaviour of the medium for the transmission
of light waves – which were ultimately not conrmed.
Hesse’s dual requirement for material models, according to M-1, to be pre-theoretic
and display observable similarities to the target system is quite descriptive of how
models are in fact often used in science. Conceptually and logically, the parts of the
conjunct are independent though, either in the way described by Nagel (1961) or in
the more fundamental sense of models being genuinely autonomous from theory
(Morrison 1999). A model may bear observable similarities to the target system and
be based on a pre-existing theory, for example when functioning as an illustration
or exemplication of the theory’s empirical content. Hence, a third denition can be
introduced that aims at a class of models whose role in advancing science may be
comparatively modest, but whose role in elucidating it should not be neglected:
M-3 models are structures that materially exemplify the observable consequences of
an established theory, demonstrating its bearing on phenomena.
Conversely, a model might be pre-theoretic in a similar fashion to that envisioned by
Hesse for material models while referring to observables in a more abstract and indirect
way. This possibility has been explored by Bas van Fraassen (1980) in particular:
M-4 models are structures that bear a formally dened relation of isomorphism
to their target system, without either observable similarities or a pre-existing
theory being presupposed.
Denition M-4 matches the “semantic” view of theories, under which theories are
not sets of propositions articulated in a specied formal language. Instead, they are
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presented “in the rst instance by identifying a class of structures as its models”,
where “the same class of structures could well be described in radically dierent ways”
(van Fraassen 1980, 44). The classes of structures involved are identied by reference
to relations of isomorphism. Theories, in turn, are descriptions of a set of related
isomorphic structures or “a family of models” that share a specic set of properties
(van Fraassen 1980, 65).
Accordingly, models are epistemically more central to science than theories. By
the same token, theories are genealogically not prior to models, but dened by them.
According to van Fraassen’s own example, Isaac Newton attempted to map the ap-
parent, observable movements of bodies both onto one another and onto the true
movements of bodies that he assumed to occur in an absolute space. If these images are
understood as isomorphic, the observed movements can be represented as dierences
between true movements in absolute space. Absolute space is not observable itself
but described by the family of models of apparent motion.
An important implication of the last of the above approaches to modelling (M-4),
but partly also of the rst (M-1), is that it substitutes the condition of truth for the
propositions of a theory with the condition of empirical adequacy (van Fraassen 1980,
12-13). If models are images, as Hertz (1899) suggested, or even if models are any
closer in nature to images than to propositions, they cannot be strictly speaking true
or false but only more or less faithful or adequate in a number of respects. A model
may vindicate but does not verify any theory that it might support. If one abstains
from ascribing truth values to pictures or other non-propositional structures, and
hence also to models (as Hertz 1899 does), and especially if one allows theories to be
non-propositional structures, too (as van Fraassen 1980 does), empirical adequacy will
be the strongest possible normative judgement on the value of a theory or the models
on which it may rest.
However, the empirical adequacy of a model is a function not only of empirical t
but also of the purposes and resources of inquiry. This pragmatic leitmotif of modelling
in science, and in fact of science altogether, is explicit already in Hertz (1899). It also
gures in van Fraassen (1980) and other anti-realist approaches as well as in what is
called the “practice turn” in the philosophy of science (inaugurated by Hacking 1983
and recently summarised in Soler et al. 2014).
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The degrees of freedom in how models may relate to world aairs, pre-theoretic
versus theory-based and materially versus formally, and the pragmatic considerations
that go into designing these relations, become particularly manifest in the most recent
major addition to repertoire of scientic methodology: computer simulations.
3 Simulations and Models
A paradigmatic albeit extremely broad denition of simulations that puts them in
the context of scientic modelling is given by Stephan Hartmann: “a simulation
imitates one process by another process,” where “the term ‘process’ refers solely to
some object or system whose state changes in time” (Hartmann 1996, 83, emphasis
in original). According to this denition, simulations, in the most straightforward
cases, can plainly be dynamic models that seek to trace the outward behaviours or
the internal dynamics of a system. Consequently, a computer simulation will be a
computer implementation of such a dynamic model. In scientic practice, simulations
are typically computer simulations, so that the terms “simulation” and “computer
simulation” come to be used synonymously. (I will henceforth refer to computer
simulations simply as “simulations”.)
Paul Humphreys introduces a paradigmatic denition of computer simulations
that goes beyond this de facto constraint on simulations and moves from material
to formal criteria: “A computer simulation is any computer-implemented method
for exploring the properties of mathematical models where analytic methods are
unavailable” (Humphreys 2004, 107-8). This denition is too narrow, as the author
himself admits, as computer simulations often provide solutions to models that are
analytically tractable. It is also too broad, he concedes, as it also covers areas of
computational science otherwise unrelated to simulations.
Between these two poles of maximal generality and specicity, one will nd ac-
counts of computer simulations that highlight both their dynamic, material and their
mathematical, model-solving character. Typically, the connection between a simula-
tion and its target system is conceived of as a two-step relation, as critically discussed
by Eric Winsberg (2010, 9-11, 19-25): simulations are, in a rst step, computer im-
plementations of formal models. They are designed to algorithmically solve, that
is, to provide concrete values for, the variables of those models. The simulation’s
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output counts as the model’s solution. In a second step, the solution helps to decide
on the model’s empirical adequacy. In the parlance of simulation-based science, if the
algorithms in question match the formal model, the simulation is veried. If the model
underlying the simulation is found to correctly represent its target, the simulation is
validated.
According to this two-step image, a simulation represents its target system by rst
realising the underlying model. However, verication and validation may not be so
clearly distinguishable in practice. A model and its implementation are often mutually
adjusted in pragmatic fashion in order to make them both solvable and empirically
adequate. Such pragmatic considerations motivate Winsberg (2010, 19) to characterise
simulational methods as “motley”. Simulations might be informed by established
theories, but also resort to theoretically unprincipled assumptions, intuition, tricks and
tinkering, so as to bring model, simulation and, possibly, observation into accordance.
The implications, however, might not be as relativistic as it may seem at rst sight, as
a greater amount of background knowledge, relative to traditional observational and
experimental methods, will compensate for ad-hoc practices in simulation modelling
(Winsberg 2010, 70-71).
Most authors consider simulations are suciently dened by their formal model-
solving properties, as far as “core simulations” are concerned, in contrast to complete
“computer models” (Humphreys 2004, 110) or what Winsberg (2010, 16-17) calls “models
of the phenomena” (see also Hartmann 1996, 84). In boundary cases, simulations may
have no empirical referent at all.
Conversely, the design and logic of computer simulations are subject to mate-
rial constraints imposed by the available mathematical and computational resources.
Humphreys (2004, 56) argues that “[m]ost scientic models are specically tailored to t,
and hence be constrained by, the available mathematics” (emphasis in original), and that
“It is the invention and deployment of tractable mathematics that drives much progress in
the physical sciences” (Humphreys 2004, 55, emphasis in original). Johannes Lenhard
(2015) adds the complementary observation that mathematical models have to be
tailored to a given set of computational resources. At any given time, an empirical
problem may be treated by simulational methods only to the extent that a specic set
of computational and mathematical tools is available.
10
3 Simulations and Models
Within the limits of those pragmatic enablers and constraints, a simulation will
typically also comprise a material, observable rendering of their output, mostly in
the form of visualisations or other representations of its output with respect to the
variables identied in the underlying formal model (Humphreys 2004, 111; Winsberg
2010, 31-34). That rendering has its own criteria of empirical adequacy, in terms of
observable similarities. The kind of presentation is chosen in accordance with the
visualisation methods that are available, the characteristics of the target system that are
considered particularly relevant, and the ways in which these are best communicated.
Conversely, it is historically plausible that the lack of suitable means of visualisation
and communication has impeded the introduction of advanced simulation-based
models in the early days of computing, as Rainer Hegselmann (2017) argues with
reference to the Sakoda model as an equally sophisticated and unsuccessful early foray
into computer-based social science.
Despite de facto usually travelling together, the formal and material aspects of
modelling are partly separate aairs in systematic respects: a straightforward mathe-
matical solution to a model is amenable only in the case of what Peter Asaro (2011,
93) calls “analytic” simulations, where it is possible to (locally) apply a pre-existing
(general) theory. In this paradigmatic set of simulation-based investigations, a formal
theory of the target system is involved, which will inform a set of formal models to be
implemented in a computer. On the basis of input data from the target system, the
computer will then generate an output that can be demonstrated to be isomorphic
to what the theoretical propositions would predict. In boundary cases, no empirical
referent might be involved at all, if and when the simulation solves equations using
ctional or altogether non-referring data.
Conversely, “synthetic” simulations are designed to produce analogues of the phe-
nomena that are to be investigated in the absence of theory. Hessean material analogies,
in terms of observable similarities, take centre stage. From the observation of these
analogies, a set of theoretical hypotheses may be generated and then be subject to
further testing. For example, a sequence of variant or even contradicting models can
be tested and compared or the eects of ctitious values of key variables surveyed.
In this type of simulation, the use of computers as universal machines actually ex-
ploits the lack of material constraints. In a complementary boundary case to that of
non-referring models, it might happen that a genuine theoretical understanding of
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the target system is not even sought, or is considered out of reach. In such cases,
behavioural similarities between model and target may be considered sucient for the
purposes at hand. To some authors, the latter seems the primary use of simulations
under ‘technoscientic’ conditions (Nordmann 2011; Galison 2017).
The two types of boundary case aside, the distinction between analytic and syn-
thetic simulations bears an analogy to the distinctions between theory-guided and
exploratory experimentation (Burian 1997; Steinle 1997; Ribe and Steinle 2002; Wa-
ters 2007) and, relatedly, between theory-guided and exploratory modelling (Fisher
2006; Gelfert 2016). Where theory-guided experimentation and modelling amount to
the testing of theoretical hypotheses by empirical means that are to a large degree
determined by the respective theories, exploratory experimentation and modelling
lack both the guidance and the constraints provided by a pre-existing theory. Instead,
they have been described as practices of “getting a feel” for the phenomenon or model
(Gelfert 2016, 96). This seeming lack of conceptual and empirical focus is not to be
considered a decit though, but serves to ground an alternative approach that has
respectable historical credentials, from Goethe to Faraday (Steinle 1997; Ribe and
Steinle 2002).
With respect to exploratory experimentation, “Its dening characteristic is the
systematic and extensive variation of experimental conditions to discover which of
them inuence or are necessary to the phenomena under study” (Ribe and Steinle 2002,
46). Its aim is “to open up the full variety and complexity of a eld, and simultaneously
to develop new concepts and categories that allow a basic ordering of that multiplicity”
(ibid.). Variation of conditions, as the previous quotes suggest, is anything but random.
Instead, it follows preliminary conceptions of how the phenomena might be aected
by such variation, where these conceptions are judged to have a promise of furnishing
explanations. Exploration paradigmatically – but not always, as will be demonstrated
– serves the development of a theory, and embodies the key characteristics of the
material, pre-theoretic type of models described by Hesse (1966) in more poignant
fashion perhaps than she envisioned herself.
The material character of exploratory modelling in particular stands in a peculiar
relation to the properties of computer simulations outlined above: Given that the
mathematical structures involved in many models are particularly keen to exploratory
manipulation, variation of parameters may come “too cheaply” as compared to ex-
12
4 Varieties of Models and Simulations in AI
perimental practice and its material constraints (cf. Gelfert 2016, 79, 82). Simulations,
if anything, facilitate the manipulation of mathematical structures across the entire
range of available possibilities. Given that computers are universal machines in Tur-
ing’s sense, for being capable in principle of accomplishing any logico-mathematical
task that is amenable to a solution at all (Turing 1936), the role of an elaborate theory
to constrain the range of simulational possibilities, and give direction to an inquiry,
has been argued to be more important than in experimental practice or direct, artefact-
based modelling (Asaro 2011; Guala 2002). Such a theory is not always available
though, nor does it have to be, as long as the range of possibilities is meaningfully
and methodically constrained.
Simulations with exploratory functions have assumed particular importance in one
scientic eld that has received comparatively little attention in the philosophy of
modelling and simulation to date but that displays an unrivalled variety of approaches
to modelling and simulation: Articial Intelligence. In its origins as an extremely open
and theoretically under-dened eld, it oered itself for a multitude of approaches to
modelling and simulation, some of which are still of relevance today.
4 Varieties of Models and Simulations in AI
AI co-originated with computer science and played a formative role in the development
of the cognitive sciences. Unlike most well-established sciences, and unlike physics
in particular, the cognitive sciences were not in a position to rely on an axiomatic
theory of their subject matter. The cognitive sciences arose in the mid-20th century
from a growing dissatisfaction both with classical introspective psychology and with
behaviourism. Neither of these two approaches had a reasonably well-developed, let
alone an axiomatic, theory of cognitive processes at their disposal. Introspective psy-
chology lacked the credentials of objective science altogether, whereas behaviourism
did not accept cognitive phenomena as amenable to and worthy of scientic considera-
tion, and restricted itself to a systematic inquiry into observable behaviour. Confronted
with a number of explanatory problems unsolvable by either behaviourism or intro-
spective psychology, the cognitive sciences were founded in order to develop a novel
approach to scientic psychology. Lacking a psychological theory to rely on, the
endeavour commenced with models, and with computer models and their implemen-
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tations in particular, in the hope to be able work its way upwards to a comprehensive
theoretical account.
AI played a prominent and particular role in the development of the cognitive
sciences in that it, rst and foremost, provided them with a novel set of methods.
However, AI was in a unique position that went much deeper than methodological
innovation. In his seminal contribution to applied mathematics, “On Computable
Numbers”, Alan Turing (1936) conceived of theoretical machines, now known as
“Turing Machines”, along the lines of a subset of cognitive operations, namely those
involved in the accomplishment of basic routines of arithmetic or “computation”.
As Turing demonstrated, complex mathematical operations may be broken down
into such elementary operations in such a way that they could in principle also be
accomplished by those machines. Hence, these machines would be able to solve any
logical-mathematical task that is amenable to a solution at all. However, the machines
designed by Turing were rst and foremost theoretical machines, based on his theory
of computation. The functions of these theoretical machines were purposefully dened
in abstraction from any specic realisation and application, while being modelled on
the basis of the performances of human “computers”. In this sense, Turing used the
material model of human computers as a neutral analogy (M-1) in the development
of his theory of computation. (Another material model that inspired the design of
Turing’s theoretical machines on a more concrete level was the mechanical typewriter,
as suggested by Andrew Hodges 1983, 96-98.)
Accordingly, there is an element of modelling human cognitive processes that went
into the foundations of computer science. In turn, the endeavour of the cognitive
sciences was to build on this analogy in order to develop computer-implementable
scientic models of higher-level human cognitive abilities. However, there also was
a, more or less implicit, suggestion of a direct, behaviour-based analogy between
human and machine accomplishments. This analogy was introduced in fairly playful
manner in Turing’s later essay “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950), and
there is a remarkable ambiguity in Turing’s work between these analogies (lucidly
described in Sprevak 2017). However, the latter analogy was transformed into a
research programme by later authors, and subsequently shaped public perception of
AI, as may be illustrated by the fact that the Loebner Prize competition for a computer
that passes the “Turing Test” and related eorts (see also Warwick and Shah 2016).
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With respect to the role of human cognition in AI modelling, it is worth high-
lighting that from its very beginnings, AI comprised two expressly distinct research
programmes. Only one of them has human cognition as its topic and thereby belongs
to the cognitive sciences proper, whereas the other paved the way for the success of
AI in many elds of application, but did not pursue a scientic agenda with respect
explaining human cognitive abilities. Remarkably, the latter approach corresponds
to the original denition of “Articial Intelligence”, in which intelligent, cognitively
advanced human behaviour serves as a resource for modelling. An early anthology of
foundational works in AI (Feigenbaum and Feldman 1963) was divided into two parts
accordingly (see also Ringle 1979; Asaro 2011):
S-1 computer programs that solve complex intellectual tasks without prima facie
regard to modelling cognitive functions; the aim is “to construct computer
programs which exhibit behavior that we call ‘intelligent behavior’ when we
observe it in human beings” (Feigenbaum and Feldman 1963, 3);
S-2 simulations that implement models of the structure or functions of natural cog-
nitive processes, without prima facie regard to creating similarities in observable
behaviour; the aim is the “simulation of cognitive processes” (op. cit., 269).
Simulations of the rst type (S-1) are also called “behaviour-based simulations” because
they make no or no systematic attempt to establish analogies between the computa-
tional processes involved in a computer’s attempt to solve a task and the cognitive
processes involved when a person tries to solve the same task. Conversely, it is the
task of S-2 simulations to provide analogies at the level of cognitive processes and
functions, which are not necessarily linked to the generation of behavioural similari-
ties at the observational level. Taking such similarities to be indicators of underlying
processes and proposing the supposed analogies as denitions of intelligence, or even
as evidence for machine intelligence, has been identied as a fateful misunderstanding
of AI by several authors (e.g., Copeland 2000; Moor 1976; Whitby 1996).
The distinction between S-1 and S-2 simulations in AI can be further rened and
rendered in a new light by reference to the previously introduced coordinates of
material versus formal and theory-guided versus explorative modelling (M-1 to M-4).
It will thereby become possible to map out more precisely which scientic programs
and theories the various AI approaches serve, and how they do this.
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AI-1 – behavioural simulations: Some AI simulations are of an entirely phenom-
enal and material kind. They are concerned with the imitation of a subset of the
observable behaviours of human beings, without a prima facie regard to the under-
lying structures and functions they may serve. Such is paradigmatically the case for
Turing’s “imitation game” (1950) and the so-called “Turing Test”-based approaches
to AI that were derived from it. Turing introduces the imitation game as a thought
experiment in which he asks the reader to imagine computers being involved in a
blinded conversation between a (female) human being, a (male) impersonator and an
interrogator. The blinding of the conversation would be accomplished by restricting
communication between the players to teletype messages. The question is whether
a machine substitute of the human impersonator in such a game could be identied
by the human interrogator within a certain time with a certain degree of reliability.
Turing himself emphasised that his imitation game neither provides a denition of
intelligence nor a proof of machine intelligence, as he states in a 1952 BBC broadcast
quoted in Copeland (2004, 494-5). He even calls the question “‘Can machines think?’
[. . . ] too meaningless to deserve discussion” (Turing 1950, 442), and proposes to replace
it with the question whether a digital computer would do well in the imitation game.
As there is no pretence of systematically accounting for the structure or function of
human thought in this approach to AI, there is no prima facie theoretical underpinning
to these ‘black box’ simulations. Nor do these simulations presuppose a model that
represents relevant properties of its target system in order to develop a theory from
it. All that Turing does is to informally suggest some analogies between human and
machine capabilities. He explores these analogies more systematically in other works
(especially Turing 1948), which are closer to what will be discussed in AI-3. Accordingly,
the scientic modelling relations M-1, M-2, and M-4 are not applicable to the imitation
game and Turing-Test-based AI. The status of this kind of simulation as scientic has
consequently been contested, which has not prevented them from being perceived
as the paradigm of AI by the general public and AI critics alike. However, these
approaches may serve relevant demonstrative purposes (Ringle 1979; Asaro 2011), and
hence fall under the M-3 category of theory-guided material models. They demonstrate
the force and scope of Turing’s theory of computation by making computers exhibit
partly human-like behaviours, which were beyond what, in Turing’s time, was deemed
within the reach of machines de facto and by denition. The expected eect was that
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our notions both of machines and of thinking are altered in the course of the spread
of digital computers. This is Turing’s declared goal in (1950, 442). Conversely, the
simulation’s observable human-like behaviour can be mobilised to identify some of the
behavioural cues by which human beings recognise each other as intelligent beings.
AI-2 – models of general intelligence: Some AI simulations are implementations
of models that are designed to represent a selection of cognitive accomplishments in
such a way that they collectively serve to dene a theory of general intelligence. These
AI models embody abilities of, for example, theorem-proving, logical problem-solving,
chess- and Go-playing or data analysis that one would call intelligent when observed
in human beings. General intelligence is what systems like logic-based AI (McCarthy
1960) or the Logic Theory Machine (Newell, Shaw, et al. 1963) were supposed to
achieve. The models involved were not designed to furnish or support explanations
of how, in particular, human nervous systems or, more generally, human beings
accomplish the logic-based tasks in question. Instead, they support explanations of
how these tasks are to be solved by any intelligent system.
Dierent in approach but similar in general outlook is the more application-oriented
side of classical connectionism or neural network modelling (Rumelhart and McClel-
land 1986, Vol. 1). In one of the most successful current AI approaches derived from
the latter, Deep Learning algorithms are used for object or image recognition (LeCun
et al. 2015; Schmidhuber 2015). Structures are extracted from data sets on numerous
levels of abstraction in order to generate representations or classications that are
interpretable for humans. However, the levels of abstraction and the processing stages
do not need to correspond to structures and processes in the human nervous system.
Similar to AI-1, observable similarities between logic-based or Deep Learning models
and human cognitive processes are welcome, but they are not the actual aim of inquiry.
However, based on partial formal isomorphisms between the logical operations or
neuronal processes in model and human thinking, these models can be argued to
form unied classes that dene theories of general intelligence in human beings and
machines.
To the extent that a theory is a family of models, and to the extent that formal
isomorphisms are what unites this family, AI-2 models fall under the M-4 class. A
separate and explicit, let alone an axiomatic, denition of what general intelligence is
17
4 Varieties of Models and Simulations in AI
will not be required under this approach, as the models in the class suciently dene
such a theory. While ‘brute force’ computational solutions of logico-mathematical
problems cannot provide foundations to a theory of general intelligence, general-level
formal analogies of the aforementioned kind will be sucient for a system to count as
Articial Intelligence.
Remarkably, theorem proving, chess playing and their kin were very explicitly
chosen by early and classical AI researchers over other constituents of human men-
tal life, such as emotion or embodied phenomena, not because these were deemed
irrelevant features, but for two complementary reasons: On the one hand, logically
explicable cognitive tasks were amenable to formalisation and computer simulation
by the means available at the time (as recounted, for example, by Boden 2006, 11).
On the other hand, the solution of logic-based problems was also considered to be
the core or even the exclusive domain of cognition sensu strictu, and as such treated
apart from other aspects of the human condition. Consequently, this approach to AI
remains only tangentially concerned with systematic inquiries into the human mind
as a whole. Instead, it informed all kinds of application-oriented AI, where intelligent
problem-solving remains the key objective.
AI-3 – material models of cognitive processes: Some AI simulations are imple-
mentations of models designed to contribute to the development of a theory of the
general laws of human cognition. The observable properties of the computational
models and the regularities therein serve as templates for those laws. The modelling
relations involved here are of the pre-theoretic material kind (M-1): a set of positive,
negative and neutral analogies between computational and mental processes is postu-
lated, where a central task of further inquiry is to determine the neutral ones as being
either positive or negative.
Prominent examples for this kind of approach include Marr’s account of the stages of
visual processing (Marr 1982) and classical cognitively oriented connectionism (Rosen-
blatt 1958), its precursors (McCulloch and Pitts 1943; Turing 1948) and descendants
in the more cognitively oriented side of neural network modelling (Rumelhart and
McClelland 1986, Vol. 2, where the two volumes of this collection neatly replicate the
distinction in Feigenbaum and Feldman 1963 discussed as S-1 / S-2 above). In distinct
ways and with respect to distinct levels of cognitive processes, computational concepts
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are used to generate theoretical hypotheses concerning the properties and regularities
of the respective cognitive processes and structures. The focus moves away from
general problem-solving (as in AI-2) to an investigation into the constituents of natural
cognition, such as perception and the functions of the nervous system. Marr (1982)
conceives of vision as the process of constructing, throughout the stages of perceptual
processing, representations of the information contained in the retinal image: from
the representation of the two-dimensional retinal image, a “primal sketch” is devel-
oped of edges, surfaces, and textures, and then a representation of the orientation
and apparent motion of these forms. Finally, a three-dimensional representation of
spatially situated objects is generated. All of these stages are described in terms of
computational operations, and involve testable predictions as to how visual percep-
tion actually works in biological organisms, however without postulating one-to-one
correspondences between the algorithms and hardware used and organic structures
and neuronal processes. Many of Marr’s assumptions have meanwhile been refuted by
neurobiological evidence – and the neutral analogies thereby established as negative.
Conversely to Marr’s approach, connectionism devises models of the basic structure
and operations of the nervous system. These models comprise a large number of units,
representing neurones organised in several (input, hidden and output) layers, and
weights that represent the eects of the synapses that connect them. The computer
simulates the connection patterns and activation values of the neurones, where neu-
rones are taken to perform computational operations on the input signals they receive,
thereby transform them into a new signal and pass it on to the next level. Instead
of modelling certain, rather abstractly conceived, elements of cognitive processes,
connectionism targets concrete components of the nervous system that realise these
processes. A recent approach that develops connectionist ideas into a Bayesian model
of “predictive processing” in animal and human nervous systems is presented in Clark
(2013). Another contemporary approach that explores the possible import of advanced
Deep Learning methods on cognitive inquiries, in particular perceptual abstraction, is
developed in Buckner (2018).
If the cognitive sciences are dened as “the study of mind as machine” (Boden 2006,
9, emphasis in original), AI-3 approaches do not merely provide it with some methods
of inquiry but also with – diverging – research programmes that say as which kind
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of machine the mind shall be studied. If the way in which a model is realised partly
depends on the material and conceptual resources available, and if these both enable
and constrain the ways in which that model relates to a world aair, Marr’s assumption
that one can separate a computational theory of cognitive phenomena from the “gory
details of algorithms that must be run” (1977, 38) might turn out to be too idealising.
Apart from its role in the cognitive sciences, this type of AI also inspired a variety
of practical applications, but in a dierent way than AI-2: certain cognitive features
serve as models for a technological solution, as, for example, in neural network-based
applications that provide analogues of neuronal processes but are dedicated to other,
more practical purposes.
AI-4 – cognition as computation: Some AI simulations are implementations of
models that are supposed to provide direct analogues of cognitive processes, with strict
one-to-one correspondence relations between computational operations and cognitive
processes that are based on Turing’s (1936) theory of computation. In this case, the
elements of an axiomatic theory of computation and their interrelations determine
the elements of a model of cognitive processes and their interrelations, under the
premise that the same theory equally applies to both domains. The computational
states and processes proposed in the model are expressions of the propositions of
a theory that determines relations of formal analogy between computational and
cognitive processes. The theory of cognition in AI-4 is co-extensive with a theory
of computation. Hence, the modelling relation in question involved here formal and
theory-guided (M-2).
This analysis applies to the paradigmatic statement of strong symbolic AI, the
physical symbol system hypothesis (Newell and Simon 1976; Newell 1980). The basic
hypothesis is that both computation and human thinking consist in the rule-governed
manipulation of meaningful symbols. More precisely, the theory of computation
involved postulates that computation is the rule-governed manipulation of symbols,
whereas cognitive processes are one class of phenomena involving content-bearing
symbols that exemplies this theory. A physical symbol system is physical because it
consists of physical entities, namely symbol tokens. It is a system because those symbol
tokens are parts of expressions in which their relations are logically determined, and
hence can be computed. And it is symbolic because, rst, those expressions refer to
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objects, processes or other expressions and, second, the system can interpret these
expressions. If a computing system exhibits these properties, according to the physical
symbol system hypothesis, it can, in and of itself, realise the necessary and sucient
conditions for the presence of cognition. It will thereby not merely represent features
of cognitive processes, but embody them. Any mind will then be a physical symbol
system, and vice versa, so that cognition is computation (Pylyshyn 1980). This sort
of argument works in two complementary ways: on the one hand, cognitive models,
according to strong symbolic AI, are “computational in a dual sense, in that they not
only use computers to do the complex calculations required for modeling, but also
postulate that minds are actually performing a kind of computation” (Thagard 2014,
534). This kind of dual computational modelling relation raises the question whether it
applies to “biologically realistic neurocognitive models”, too (ibid.). On the other hand,
some computational processes will by denition be cognitive processes, provided that
certain conditions concerning the kind and complexity of the computations involved
are met.
Hence, strong symbolic AI regards human thought as computational by nature,
provided that the computations are performed on semantically meaningful symbols.
This latter premiss is not further explained in this approach. This has exposed strong
symbolic AI to critiques along the lines of the “symbol grounding problem” (Harnad
1990): The foundational question remains unanswered as to how the symbols involved
in cognitive phenomena come to have their semantic content. Taken by itself, the
symbols’ computability does not provide the requisite information.
5 Discussion
The preceding descriptions should have made clear that the modelling relations and
their roles are clearly distinct in each case. Only in AI-3, the simulations assume the
exploratory, theory-guiding role of models in science envisioned by Hesse (1966), but
the models developed under this type of approach have been developed into competing,
and partly mutually exclusive, theoretical accounts of human cognitive abilities. They
certainly have not given rise to a unied theory of human cognition.
In AI-2, a more general but still exploratory character of the modelling relations is
bought at the cost of being focused not on natural, human cognition but on higher-level
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isomorphisms between computational and some cognitive processes. This, however,
was the original self-understanding of AI as a research programme in the rst place.
The scientic clout of general intelligence approaches has turned out to be relatively
more modest with respect to explaining natural cognitive phenomena, but they proved
to be more enduring, although mostly outside cognitive inquiries.
Turing Test-based approaches (AI-1) remain highly visible but are as tenuously
related to scientic modelling as ever, while having shaped the public image of AI. In
the beginning, they primarily stood in the service of one (namely Turing’s) theory of
computation, being employed by its inventor to demonstrate the power and scope of
that theory. The intended analogies to cognitive phenomena remained informal, but
meanwhile have come to be interpreted in a stronger sense.
Only in strong symbolic AI (AI-4), the analogies are strictly formal and theory-
guided, to the point of making the theory of computation a theory of cognition – and
thereby making the properties of model and target system fall into one. It was the
key target of philosophical AI critiques but lost much of scientic credentials after the
days of “Good Old-Fashioned AI” (GOFAI). It would be worth to further pursue the
argument that strong symbolic AI turned out scientically sterile precisely because it
was not in the business of opening up new domains of phenomena to model-based
investigation and subsequent theory-building but imposed one theory on one domain
of phenomena in top-down fashion.
It should be noted that these approaches are not necessarily strictly disjunct. Some-
times they blend into each other and can only be dierentiated according to their
respective primary foci. For example, while AI-2 approaches are separated from AI-3
by their explanatory aims, they are distinguished from AI-4 by their ontological pre-
suppositions: does AI seek a computational theory of general intelligence (AI-2), or
does it propose a theoretically principled identity relation to hold on a general level
between computational and cognitive processes (AI-4)? It should also be noted that in
some prominent cases the same AI researchers have pursued dierent approaches in
dierent projects (Turing, Newell and Simon are the most notable examples here).
The conceptual distinctions developed in this taxonomy cut across a number of
established dichotomies that have traditionally been used to sort the eld of AI: First,
the proposed classication remains prima facie indierent to the dichotomy between
symbolic and embodied processes, which largely separates GOFAI and its heirs from
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modern or “Nouvelle AI” approaches and the most inuential AI critiques alike: do
symbolic forms and logical operations of the kind involved in abstract, higher-level
human thought, provide the necessary and sucient ingredients for a model of human
cognition in its entirety, or must such a model also or even primarily capture the
embodied and environmentally embedded nature of cognitive phenomena? According
to the most prominent critique of the symbolic AI in Dreyfus (1979), an approach of
the latter kind would be required but is unattainable for AI in principle. Second, the
matrix presented above is more dierentiated and should be more systematic than
the rather intuitive programmatic distinction between the simulation of intelligent
behaviour and the simulation of cognitive processes present already in early AI. Third,
it operates on a dierent level than the distinction with which the previous one has
been combined in the leading AI textbook, namely between human-like and non-
human-like AI on the level of observable similarities, from which the following matrix
has been generated: “thinking humanly” versus “acting humanly” versus “thinking
rationally” versus “acting rationally” (Russell and Norvig 2010, 1-5).
The distinctions between formal and material models and between pre-theoretical
and theoretical models can provide further analysis to the similarity criterion at issue
here: if a selection of formally reconstructed features of human cognition is used to
design systems that provide solutions to intellectual problems on a general level (AI-2),
it is unlikely that the aim of this kind of approach will be a material model or even a
theory of human cognition in particular – unless an identity relationship is assumed
(AI-4). Conversely, if models of human cognitive traits are used to design systems that
are supposed to be similar to human thought or behaviour in some relevant respects,
the desired modelling relationship will certainly be material, as it either serves to
develop a theory of these phenomena (AI-3) or seeks to demonstrate the observable
consequences of an existing theory that is based on a presumed fundamental material
likeness between human and machine computation (AI-1).
The key dierence between the conceptual matrix proposed here and the established
classications is that the focus here is not on elucidating what is modelled and simu-
lated, but on how and for what purpose this is done. In S-1 and S-2, AI comprised two
very dierent types of answers to “what” questions, but that distinction alone oers
little systematic insight into how modelling is or shall be accomplished on either side.
The symbolic / embodied dichotomy, in turn, is concerned with presumed properties
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of the target systems but has implications for how models are supposed to look like:
they either will be symbolic all the way down, or they will necessarily have to be
embodied. This decision is made on the level of ontological presuppositions rather
than methodology though.
The distinction between formal and material models in particular oers an indirect
route to capturing a point that is missed by the previous dichotomies: much of classical
AI had little concern for how cognitive processes are materially realised, but this
is plainly the reverse side of the same computational coin, in that AI had equally
little prima facie concern for how its models are materially realised. Computational
principles, and hence logico-mathematical rules alone, were taken to serve as the
enablers and constraints of AI modelling, as if they were implementation-independent
concepts. They certainly were so in principle, by virtue of being thus dened in
Turing’s theory of computation, but they were not so in practice, where modelling
decisions had major consequences for the answers that would be given to “how” and
“what” questions alike.
To conclude my discussion by explicating this point, I will now argue for a special
relation of AI models to their implementation. This argument has one pragmatic
and one conceptual aspect. A specic trait that sets AI apart from other sciences
in pragmatic terms is its particular entwinement with the realisation of its models,
in terms of a very concrete and material reliance on the tools and technologies of
modelling. In fact, if there is a science that is so closely tied to the way in which its
models are realised that it will be dicult to point to its models in abstraction from
their realisation, it will be AI. All approaches took the functional architecture of the
computer as such as their starting point, and most relied on the factual availability
of computers. Of course, there is the principled possibility of developing and using
computational models that are not actually implemented in digital computers – which
was the case for those models which were devised before the advent of the rst stored-
program computers in 1948. The primary examples are Turing Machines (1936) and
McCulloch and Pitts’ Logical Neurone (1943). These un-implemented models on their
own would have been unlikely to establish and sustain a research programme that
fully relies on computational principles. Conversely, these un-implemented models
contributed, and in Turing’s case were foundational, to the design of the digital
computer itself, and hence ultimately their own implementation.
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There is no such direct dependence on the availability of computers in the classical
natural sciences, which adopted computer simulation methods and integrated them
into their methodological repertoire once they were available and came to be perceived
as useful. Although physics, chemistry, biology or economics are dependent on the
availability of these methods when it comes to mastering increasingly complex subjects
matter, these disciplines as such do not comprehensively and existentially depend
on the availability of digital computers. (However, classical Baconian science might
have existentially depended on the availability of experimental apparatus in similar
fashion.) Hence, it might hence be dicult to nd any other discipline beyond AI that
invented itself and developed its key concepts and theories on the grounds of what
computers can do, and that did so across the entire range of possibilities of modelling
and simulation.
This specic implementation-dependence of AI models might be counted (and
consequently discounted) as a matter of technological fact, but there is a deeper,
more conceptual interpretation available: AI’s computational concepts and simulation
technologies are essential to the discipline because they already purport to represent
relevant properties of their target systems in and by themselves. If computers are
modelled on some aspects of human cognition, and if, in turn, these aspects are part of
what is modelled by computers in AI, there will be a solidly positive analogy between
computers and cognition that goes into the foundation of the discipline. It has to be
taken for granted even if one does not subscribe to the view that cognitive processes
are computational processes.
AI’s peculiar conjunct of a conceptual claim for a implementation-independence
in principle of computational models and a particular de facto dependence on their
implementation in practice makes most sense if one takes the presence of computational
structures and processes both in machines and in human minds to be the organising
metaphor of AI, or an “archetype” in the Blackean sense. It is an analogy, and above
that a material analogy, that has to be accepted in order for the research programme
to proceed in the rst place. This archetype is established but not explicated in
Turing’s theory of computation but becomes quite pronounced and elaborated in the
Logical Neurone approach (McCulloch and Pitts 1943; McCulloch 1960) and John von
Neumann’s claim that “the neurons of the higher animals are denitely elements [of
digital computing devices]” (Neumann 1945, § 4.2).
25
References
Whether this general idea is developed into a strict analogy between the basic
principles at work in minds and machines that is reducible to Turing’s theoretical
principles (which is assumed in AI-4 but not by von Neumann, McCulloch or even
Turing himself), or whether it informs the development of further material analogies
to guide inquiries into how the mind or the brain works (as in AI-3), is a question that
hinges upon the strictness of the interpretation of the computational archetype: does
a theory of computation suce as, and thereby constrain, the theoretical foundation
of a computation-based inquiry into cognition, or does the archetype allow for novel
computational models and their implementations to be used in the exploration of new
domains of phenomena and the development of various theories of cognition? The
dynamics of the development of AI after the days of GOFAI, especially within the realm
of AI-3 approaches, suggests the latter. If, on the other hand, the diagnosis is correct
that Turing’s theory of computation itself is based on an exploratory model, namely
the human computer, the computational archetype, even in its strict interpretation,
will rely on an analogy that is material and pre-theoretic.
The dependence of AI on models as archetypes as such will not distinguish it from
other scientic disciplines in their incipient stages, which also develop and coalesce
around a central image or metaphor (see, for example, Bensaude-Vincent 2013 and 2001
on synthetic biology and materials science respectively). However, it will be dicult
to imagine how such an archetype might dene the subject matter and determine the
methodology in other sciences to a similar extent as in AI. On some accounts (AI-4 in
particular), the guiding metaphor, the theory, the methodology and the subject matter
all are known by the analogy of the mind as computer.
The concluding thought of Black’s discussion of the importance of models as
archetypes is that “Perhaps every science must start with metaphor and end with
algebra; and perhaps without the metaphor there would never have been any algebra.”
(1962, 242) If this observation is to the point, and if the algebra in this context is
embodied by AI’s computational principles, the algebra will be the metaphor.
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